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Abstract. This article explores ofﬁce market system dynamics through a simple simulation
model. Model lag and adjustment parameters similar to real ofﬁce markets generate
explosive cycles. Simulations show that deviations from equilibrium can be reduced by
changing the information structure of the system. System dynamics, principle/agent
conﬂicts, a prisoners’dilemma game, faulty information (poor forecasting, marketresearch
and valuation techniques), regulatory institutions, and differing equilibria in ofﬁce space
and ﬁnancial markets all contribute to allocative inefﬁciency. Thinking of ofﬁce markets
as a ‘‘managed feedback control system’’ may be a useful representation of the
oversupply problem. Leverage points for system improvement may be a municipal
‘‘queue’’ to address agency and prisoner’s dilemma problems, improved forecasting
techniques and more reliance on forecasting.
Ubiquitous Cycles
Ofﬁce market cycles are surprisingly widespread. Hendershott and Kane (1992)
estimate economic losses from the oversupply in the United States in the 1980s at
US$130 billion, chieﬂy present value of lost rents from excess vacant space. London,
Stockholm, Singapore, Tokyo, Johannesburg, Toronto and many other cities have
experienced oversupply. Property oversupply certainly contributed to the worldwide
Great Depression of the 1930s. Barras (1994) maintains that investment property
oversupply occurs in every other macroeconomic cycle—about once every ten years.1
Shilton (1998) found ofﬁce employment converging towards a seven year cycle,
coincident with macroeconomic activity.
In Australia, 1993 central business district (CBD) ofﬁce vacancy rates peaked at 32%
in Perth, 27% in Melbourne and 22% in Sydney (BOMA, 1993). Sykes (1996)
estimates aggregate write-offs and provisionings by Australian lenders during 1991–
94 at AUS$28 billion, much of this due to nonperforming real estate. Writing off $28
billion would require reducing assets by AUS$280 billion to maintain bank capital
adequacy ratios at 10%. Comparing these ﬁgures to the Australian GDP of less than
AUS$500 billion, ofﬁce oversupply must have been a major cause of the severe early
1990s Australian recession.2
Ofﬁce markets may be even more volatile than in the past due to international
institutional capital ﬂows and advances in information technology. Hong Kong,
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Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Shanghai, Seoul and other Asian centers currently
face ofﬁce space oversupply. Solvency problems stemming from nonperforming
commercial property contribute to a spreading ﬁnancial crisis in the Asian tiger
economies and Japan.
Imbalances of supply and demand introduce allocative and production inefﬁciencies.
Too little supply constrains economic growth by imposing high costs on tenants and
making it more difﬁcult to add ofﬁce workers. Too much new supply leads to land
and construction cost inﬂation, followed by excess vacancy, price collapses and
negative net present values. Nonperforming properties contribute to ﬁnancial
intermediary liquidity and balance sheet crises, marketwide price drops and recessions.
Too much or too little ofﬁce investment misallocates capital, increases risk and reduces
social returns to capital. Diversity of locations, times, economic systems and political
regimes where oversupply has occurred suggests a fundamental causal mechanism in
the ofﬁce market process itself.
Explanations for Ofﬁce Oversupply Cycles
Qualitative interviews with industry informants and literature research led to a list of
ofﬁce oversupply explanations summarized as:
1. Greed or fee-driven deals. The ﬁnance literature refers to ‘‘asymmetric
information’’ or ‘‘principal/agent conﬂict’’ (Cole and Eisenbeis, 1996).
Graaskamp (1988) remarked that every expense item in a project budget
is a proﬁt center for somebody. Land assembly proﬁts, construction
proﬁts, lending institution staff bonuses, consulting fees, project
management fees and securitization fees reward decision makers even
where projects eventually fail. As one agent put it, ‘‘A lot of people don’t
get paid unless a deal happens.’’ However, more deals means that it is
less likely that all projects can perform as projected.
2. Flood of capital seeking investment opportunities and ﬁnancial
deregulation. Discussing ofﬁce oversupply in Japan, the United Kingdom
and Europe, Downs (1993) stated that ofﬁce supply is capital market
driven. Fisher (1992) recommended integration of research on property
and ﬁnancial markets. In both the U.S. and Australia, ﬁnancial
deregulation in the 1980s led to sudden increases in capital supply, some
controlled by inexpert or corrupt lenders. Asian markets experienced
foreign capital inﬂows and plentiful local capital in recent years.
Financial journalist Trevor Sykes (1996) describes a process whereby
ﬁrst interest rate spreads, then underwriting standards and ﬁnally loan
documentation deteriorated as lenders’ competed in 1980s’ Australian
markets, which offered too few legitimate opportunities. Some informants
spoke of a ‘‘herd instinct’’ among risk averse fund managers.
Brueggeman (1993) points out that lenders need time after a bust to repair
their balance sheets. This lag delays new projects, drives rents higher
and sets the stage for a new cycle.
3. Strategic behavior—the prisoners’ dilemma game. Each developer could
say, ‘‘If my project goes ahead and others’ projects do not, rents will beA SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 235
high and my project proﬁtable. If we all build, market rents will fall and
we will all lose money.’’ Research on four major Perth projects
(Kummerow, 1997) concluded that it was impossible to know during the
early stages which projects would go to completion, nor which would be
completed ﬁrst given uncertain delays at each stage during a seven to
eight year development process. In this prisoner’s dilemma game, absent
cooperation or regulation, individually rational behavior leads to a
collectively irrational outcome.
4. Land use regulatory process delays and other government policies. Land
use regulations, tax treatment of real estate, ﬁnancial regulation (or lack
of it) or other policies may promote too much or too little development.
Changing tax treatment such as the 1982 or 1986 tax acts in the U.S.
encourages or discourages new supply. Regulatory lags and delays
inherent in building approval processes extend forecasting horizons,
making mistakes more likely.
5. Faulty data and poor forecasts of supply, demand, rents and values.
Valuation ﬁrms have been sued for damages where building ﬁnance
approvals relied on faulty value-on-completion estimates. Born and Pyhrr
(1994) show that conventional valuation methods using naive trend
extrapolation misprice investment property. This mispricing exacerbates
the tendency to start too many projects during a boom and delay starting
projects during a bust. Several authors have proposed econometric
models that might improve upon naive forecasts (DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1996; and Hendershott, 1997). Roulac, Lynford and Castle
(1990) argued for more intensive, project speciﬁc data gathering and
analysis. Development budgets typically spend too little on such research
relative to investment capital at risk.
6. System dynamics. Markets often respond to current prices, forgetting
about lags and cycles. This ensures a backlog due to supply lags.
Deliveries (ofﬁce completions) must at some point exceed current
demand growth for supply to ‘‘catch up.’’ Overshooting of supply is
likely, especially if demand growth subsequently falls off due to
macroeconomic cycles.3
Anecdotal evidence indicates that every cycle is different.4 Shilton (1998), by
estimating ARIMA models, documented diverse cyclical patterns in various U.S.
cities. Financial deregulation may have contributed greatly to the 1980s oversupply,
but not be as important in the 1990s. The current cycle features securitization, global
capital markets, ofﬁce technology and corporate downsizing. All of the issues listed
above probably contribute to cycles at times and various causes interact.
System Dynamics Modeling
In the late 1950s, Jay Forrester at MIT used control theory concepts developed for
electrical engineering to simulate Harvard Business School case studies (Forrester,
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VOLUME 18, NUMBER 1, 1999
of rocket fuel, species extinctions, predator/prey systems, inventory control,
transportation systems, manufacturing processes, military battles, disease contagion,
urban growth and development, Earth’s carrying capacity for humans, etc. SD models
offer two advantages: (1) it is relatively easy to incorporate qualitative mental and
written information as well as quantitative data; and (2) simulations can be used where
data is inadequate to support statistical methods or where change in processes makes
historical data misleading. SD models are often written in difference equations,
stepping forwards in discrete time increments.
Although some SD models are complex, the basic principles of system dynamics
modeling are simple. System dynamics problems have two things in common. First,
a motive to improve a situation by suggesting how people can act upon the system.
The perspective is often similar to a corporate executive who has some degree of
control, including the possibility of changing system design if the system misbehaves.
Second, the ubiquitous presence of feedback loops. Feedbacks are of two kinds:
Goal seeking or negative feedback. A discrepancy induces corrective action
to return the system to a target state. For example, market equilibrium.
Self-reinforcing or positive feedback. Like compound interest or breeding
rabbits, growth leads to faster growth, or a decrease accelerates a collapse.
For example, a stock market panic (Coyle, 1996:10).
Insights from system dynamic models often have to do with delayed and
counterintuitive effects of feedbacks. Delays mean current information may provide
misleading signals. Coyle (1996) identiﬁes three types of delays crucial to system
dynamics: (1) time to ﬁnd out; (2) time to decide what to do; and (3) time to remedy
discrepancies from desired states. In Exhibit 1, these three delays are labelled
information, action and consequence, respectively.
The time it takes before the system reacts to discrepancies from desired states
(information ﬂows), and the speed and strength of the responses (physical
adjustments) determine the dynamic behavior of the system. In human-designed
systems, feedback structures and target state policies are open to re-design by system
managers. System models usually include both physical stocks and ﬂows and an
information structure to regulate the physical ﬂows.
Paich and Sterman (1993:1449, 1456) cite several studies showing that ‘‘decision
making is poor where decisions have delayed, indirect, non-linear, and multiple
feedback effects.’’ Their results conﬁrmed that, ‘‘In situations of high dynamic
complexity, peoples’ mental models are grossly simpliﬁed compared to reality.’’ They
presented MIT MBA with students a simple two feedback loop model posing pricing,
production and inventory control problems similar to those faced by ofﬁce market
decision-makers. Subjects showed a tendency towards ‘‘conservative demand forecasts
which ensure actual capacity will be grossly inadequate during the boom phase,
causing high backlogs, long delivery delays and market share erosion’’ (Paich and
Sterman, 1993:1452). Subjects then failed to cut capacity fast enough in the ensuingA SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 237
Exhibit 1
Coyle’s Representation of System Controlled by Information
bust. In repeated trials, although some learning took place, subjects never succeeded
in matching the performance of a simple decision rule.
Validation of SD Models
Forrester and Senge (1980) mention three classes of SD model tests—system
structure, system behavior and policy improvement tests.5 SD model validation is not
an ‘‘accept’’ or ‘‘reject’’ statistical signiﬁcance exercise, but rather a conﬁdence
building process resulting from model development and use. De Geus (1992) observes
that the future cannot be predicted, so no model can ever be a precise representation.
Parsimonious representation means models always leave out part of the story when
the system itself is complex.
Renshaw (1991:4), a biologist whose models explore species extinctions, writes:
‘‘Apparently trivial non-linear models. . . give rise to a surprisingly rich
diversity of mathematical behavior ranging from stable equilibrium points,
to stable oscillation between several points, through to a completely chaotic
regime. . . even aperiodic ﬂuctuations. Where fantasy takes over is in the
belief that the mathematically. . . ﬁne structure of deterministic chaotic
solutions might be observed in a single set of data. . .’’238 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 2
Single Negative Feedback Loop Ofﬁce Market Model
Users should take care not to confuse the model with the system. Any SD model is
a more or less informative parsimonious representation whose results are implicit in
the structure chosen. Some investigators prefer the term’s ‘‘systems thinking’’ or
‘‘system learning.’’ Models play a role as a tool for learning in helping managers to
make up their own minds.
A System Dynamics Model of an Ofﬁce Market
Coyle (1996:20) advises modelers to ‘‘think physics.’’ Physical processes, such as
constructing ofﬁce buildings, may involve unavoidable time delays. In theory,
information can be transmitted at the speed of light. In practice, information and
decision processes require physical media that may be quite slow—document
preparation, veriﬁcations and loan committee meetings. Nevertheless, information
structures and policies may be easier to modify and improve than physical processes.
Exhibit 2 represents a simple ofﬁce supply response model. A single negative feedback
loop uses discrepancies from equilibrium vacancy to control supply responses.6 When
vacancy equals the exogenously determined equilibrium vacancy (V*) supply and
demand are in balance, the discrepancy will be zero and no supply adjustment will
occur.7 If there is excess supply, the supply change called for is also zero. This implies
that buildings are not demolished or converted to other uses, a simplifying
assumption.8 Once a space shortage occurs in the model, the system adjusts to
eliminate the discrepancy, constrained by exogenous supply adjustment parameters.
Clapp (1993), Hendershott (1997) and other authors use the equilibrium vacancy rate
concept as the state towards which ofﬁce markets adjust. In markets, rents (prices),A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 239
transmit a signal of the discrepancy to suppliers. Rents respond inversely to vacancy
rates so the priceless model is consistent with the stylised facts of ofﬁce market
behavior.9
For simplicity, this model allows supply responses to be continuous, rather than
coming in ‘‘economic size building’’ increments. Future research will examine this
‘‘building size’’ issue and its effect on cycles. However, excess vacancy in
oversupplied markets has often been several times the size of the city’s largest
building.10
Model supply adjustment is a function of four parameters, which give rise to system
behavior:
1. Oversupply. The oversupply parameter, OS, is the ratio of orders to
discrepancy. Orders 5 OS*XV.I fOS, is 1, developers seek to build
exactly the amount of space needed to bring the market back to
equilibrium. If OS is 2, they order twice the discrepancy. Agency and
prisoner’s dilemma market failures justify inclusion of this parameter.11
2. Adjustment time. In ofﬁce supply data, one can observe that supply
additions do not all appear in one year, but spread across perhaps two to
four years. Adjustment time, A, represents delays in commencements.
When XV*OS amount of space is ordered, XV/A*OS will be commenced
in that year. Spreading out of projects is due to planning lags early in
the ofﬁce market development process. For example, if there is a need
for 900,000 sq. ft. of new space, and the adjustment parameter is 3, the
market will commence 300,000 sq. ft. The remaining 600,000 sq. ft.
becomes a backlog. Each year the discrepancy is updated and a third of
the new discrepancy (including backlog) commenced.
3. Supply lag. Supply lag, SL, is the time from order to delivery, deﬁned as
construction time minus the demand forecast horizon. Physically,
construction may require two to three years for major projects. However,
anticipating future discrepancies could result in projects being
commenced early in anticipation of future demand, thereby reducing the
supply lag to less than the construction time.12 If SL were zero, for
example, projects would be completed in the year they are needed, the
ideal situation. SL 5 0 implies forecasting demand at the physical
construction lag horizon, i.e., two to three years. When SL 5 0, early
commencement based on forecasts creates ‘‘just in time’’ inventory to
meet future demand.
4. Equilibrium vacancy rate. Desired holdings of vacant ofﬁce space vary
directly with leasing activity in the market (more transactions implies
more inventory needed) and inversely with the costs of holding vacant
space.13
How well the system functions can be proxied by how close it stays to equilibrium.
Taking the discrepancy XV 5 S 2 (D 1 V*) as the system error, statistics such as
root mean square error or mean absolute percentage error summarize system allocative240 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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efﬁciency over time. Error statistics could not go to zero except in a static market
with no construction or demand changes. Large errors reﬂect oversupply cycles.
Simulation Results
The ‘‘base run’’ or ‘‘reference mode’’ of the system was set at:
n Equilibrium vacancy 10%.14
n Supply lag 5 0. The model delivers new supply within the same period
in which a discrepancy from the desired vacancy rate occurs.15
n Adjustment time 1. The market responds fully to discrepancies, starting
all projects within one period.
n Oversupply 5 1. The market does not over-react. New supply orders
equal new demand.
These parameter settings do not represent the current state of the system. Instead,
they represent an ideal situation towards which the system might evolve via system
redesign and policy changes. The choice of 1970–2010 as the x–axis values in the
plots is arbitrary as are supply and demand initial levels. The software used is
ITHINK, a system dynamics simulation package with a convenient graphical interface.
Exhibit 3 shows the effects of increasing the construction lag time in an economy
with steady 2% per annum ofﬁce demand growth. When SL 5 0, the market stays
near equilibrium. Supply growth exactly tracks demand—an efﬁcient market that
clears within one time period (Exhibit 3, Panel A).
With the SL set to one year, steady growth in demand leads to a decaying cycle
(Exhibit 3, Panel B). With the supply lag at two years (Exhibit 4), the cycle
explodes—successive cycle’s amplitude increases. Note that in this case, OS, the
oversupply parameter, is set to 1 meaning orders match discrepancy—oversupply
cycles in Exhibit 3, Panel C are not due to too many fee driven deals. The explosive
cycles in Panel C come solely from steady economic growth and a two-year supply
lag, where new supply orders depend on current vacancy conditions. If we infer that
rents reﬂect vacancy conditions, this means lenders underwrite projects based on
current rents. Thus, a ‘‘conservative’’ approach of waiting until rents justify
construction, leads to an explosive cycle due to construction lags. A lender policy
meant to avoid risk creates risk.
We see from these results that supply lags on the order of two years can generate the
seven- to ten-year cycle found in ofﬁce market data. Additional building
commencements continue during the two-year supply lag, resulting in a ten-year peak-
to-peak pattern of backlog and overshoot.16 System behavior depends upon responses
to a discrepancy updated and responded to in each period. The recursive difference
equations, which drive the results, could generate other patterns, even chaotic or
irregular cycles, with other parameter values. The overall outcome or pattern depends
on the growth rate and equilibrium vacancy rate, as well as the three supply responseA SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 241
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Exhibit 4
Supply and Demand Changes—Adjustment Time Effect
parameters OS, SL and A. Although the model is relatively simple, the SD software
allows the length of the cycles to change, depending on how long it takes to ‘‘catch
up’’ with each period’s backlog. System dynamics recursive updating captures
complex dynamics that are more difﬁcult to treat in a static econometric system of
equations whose lag order is invariant across time periods.
Spreading out project commencements by setting adjustment times, A, to greater than
1, tends to decrease amplitude of cycles (see Exhibit 4, A 5 2). This quantiﬁes a
qualitatively obvious result: Starting too many projects in a single year could lead to
oversupply. However, higher adjustment times also increase mean average percentage
error (MAPE) because of slower catching up to demand. The analytical solution in
the Appendix demonstrates that with SL 5 2 and OS 5 1, then the optimum setting
for A (given V* 5 .10 and demand growth 2%) is around 1.5 with system behavior
becoming less efﬁcient on either side of this setting.
In certain regions, the system is quite sensitive to relatively small changes in parameter
values. Reducing the SL delay only one quarter, from eighteen months to ﬁfteen
months (SL 5 1.5 to SL 5 1.25, Exhibit 5), nearly eliminates the cycle. If the real
system behaves anything like these model results, major increases in market efﬁciency
can be had by a combination of: (1) reducing planning and construction lags; (2)
forecasting demand and building for it, rather than waiting until demand is on hand;
and (3) spreading out commencements over time.
No long term cyclical behavior emerged from a single demand spike. Even if supply
is constrained in the short run (long adjustment time), a demand shock will eventually
be accommodated. System adjustment parameters create cycles, random shocks do
not create cycles. For example, Exhibit 6 shows supply responses to a ‘‘boom’’A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 243
Exhibit 5
Model 1: Supply and Demand Changes—Sensitive or Offsetting Cycles
demand shock, two years of 10% annual growth. Panel A shows no cycling because
the SD parameters allow for adjustment without a supply lag. Panel B shows cycles
due to lags in system dynamic parameters. The shock does produce overshoot
followed by cessation of construction, but after that, the lags generate cycles.
Real systems are confronted with shocks in each period. The demand series in Exhibit
7 is random shocks with mean 0 and standard deviation .03 added to a 2% growth
trend.17 We saw in Exhibit 5, Panel A that with a steady 2% demand growth, parameter
settings of SL 5 1.5, OS 5 1.5 and A 5 2 produce exploding cycles. Confronted with
random demand shocks plus trend growth, the same system settings again generate
cyclical supply response behavior—four supply peaks during this 40-year simulation.
Not all patterns of random shocks generate cyclical behavior with these system
adjustment parameter settings, but most do. Shocks can cancel out or reinforce the244 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 6
Supply and Demand Changes with Growth Spike
underlying system dynamics, but the system’s adjustment parameters tend to create
cycles under most patterns of shocks, given an underlying growth trend. Shocks and
changes in system parameters over time probably explain why cycles vary in
amplitude and period, but the tendency to cycle comes from the system’s lag and
feedback structure.A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 245
Exhibit 7
Random Demand Shocks—Supply lag 1.5, Oversupply 1.5,
Adjustment Time 2
Exhibit 8
Historical Sydney Supply (3), Demand (1) and Model-Generated Supply
Response (2) with Supply Lag 0, Oversupply 1 and Adjustment Time 1
Exhibit 8 uses historical space absorption ﬁgures as the model’s exogenous demand
input. Historical Sydney CBD ofﬁce demand change (net absorption) shows a spike
in 1978, positive take-up in the mid–1980s, negative demand in the early 1990s and
demand recovery beginning in 1992.18 Series 3 plots actual supply changes during the
period. Note how poorly supply matched demand during the early 1990s when246 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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massive new supply hit the market during a recession just as demand fell. Series 2
shows the supply changes generated by the model at its ‘‘efﬁcient market’’ settings
in response to the historical demand ﬁgures. These ‘‘track’’ demand with a short lag
except for the constraint that supply change does not go below zero.
When lags are included (graph omitted here), the model parameters can be set to do
as badly as the real system in matching supply and demand, generating pronounced
cycles in response to the historical demand pattern. The model can be set to mimic a
real ofﬁce market by adjusting the parameters to give some indication of lags in the
real system. The model can also be set to perform worse than the real system. With
longer lags, the model’s response to the historical demand data becomes a huge supply
peak, which shuts off production for the duration of the simulation.
Model Validity
The strongest argument for whatever validity the simulation model may have is that
the adjustment equations seem similar to what occurs in real world markets. We know
that when demand appears, projects do not all begin immediately, justifying the
adjustment parameter, A. There are undoubtedly physical construction lags and
attempts to forecast future conditions leading to supply lags, SL. Certainly, oversupply
tendencies (OS) are a reasonable hypothesis given experience and what we know about
agency and prisoner’s dilemma problems.
It is a plausible hypothesis that the model’s behavior may resemble ofﬁce market
systems in some respects. Given system complexity and openness, no model could
provide certainty about system behavior. International comparative studies and policy
experiments could test modeling results.
Are Ofﬁce Markets Managed Systems?
Ofﬁce markets are not usually thought of as ‘‘managed systems.’’ Any individual does
not manage them as a corporation is managed. However, ofﬁce markets are designed
and managed collectively. Aggregate decisions by multiple individuals and institutions
determine system outcomes. Each decision maker can not ‘‘get it right’’ unless the
market as a whole behaves as expected. Uncoordinated management, poor
communication, lack of information and naive decision policies lead to unsatisfactory
outcomes.
Changes in system design imply institutional changes. Institutional changes come
about through what Bromley (1989) calls ‘‘institutional transactions.’’ These involve
collective decision processes with many individuals contributing to question framing,
research, conﬂict and negotiation. In Senge’s (1990:342–357) language, we need to
look for ‘‘leverage points’’ for redesigning the system structures, which shape
individual actions. He states, ‘‘Today the primary threats to our collective survival are
slow, gradual developments arising from processes that are complex both in detail and
dynamics. The spread of nuclear arms is not an event, nor is the ‘‘greenhouse effect,’’
the depletion of the ozone layer, malnutrition and underdevelopment in the thirdA SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 247
world, the economic cycles that determine our quality of life, and most of the other
large scale problems in our world.’’
Ofﬁce oversupply emerges as the collective result of many individual decisions over
a period of years. Improvements in information at the individual decision maker level
can not prevent problems and might even make things worse by reducing adjustment
time and bunching project commencements. Collective or public choice must be a
part of ofﬁce system problem solving. Coyle (1996:34) comments, ‘‘To bring about
change to a system...is essentially a political act, not a scientiﬁc one.’’
Is it Feasible to Improve System Design and Policies?
It is not easy to implement changes in complex systems with diverse stakeholders.
There are tradeoffs and possible unintended consequences of system changes.
Nevertheless, there are a number of ideas for further research and pilot studies to
change system adjustment parameters.
Supply Lag. Although design and construction innovations may decrease construction
time, building smaller projects is probably the most effective way to reduce physical
process delays. Completing planning approvals earlier is controllable by developer
decisions to submit plans earlier, and by more expeditious public sector reviews.
Singapore may have reduced ofﬁce cycle amplitude in recent years by cutting
adjustment times through government sponsored land assembly and fast planning
approvals. Singapore accomplishes ofﬁce project planning reviews in nine months that
take at least two years in Australia.19 Presenting projects for review earlier in the cycle
could create an inventory of pre-approved projects, while still allowing time for public
comment. Governments should encourage early stages of ofﬁce development to create
inventories of projects ‘‘ready to go.’’
Starting construction projects earlier in anticipation of future demand reduces supply
lag. The tradeoff is that forecasting errors increase with the forecast horizon and
mistakes are costly. However, even if future demand change were a random walk, it
would probably be best to forecast demand as the mean of the past series and begin
earlier. This would set the supply lag to zero and lead to just-in-time delivery.
Forecasting must also be used to shut off commencements once enough projects to
meet demand are in the pipeline. Lenders need to learn to take account of lags, backing
projects when current rents are low and stopping further commencements when
current rents are highest. Tenants also can play a constructive role by agreeing to
earlier pre-commitments to lease new space.
Sydney projects under construction in 1998 commenced earlier than in the last cycle,
indicating the market may be more forecasting oriented than in the past. Outcomes
are still uncertain but tendencies towards oversupply are visible. Therefore, rents may
not go up as much as expected after all. Forecasts are conditional on strategic behavior.
Oversupply. Improving contracts and reward structures could promote alignment of
interests between investors and agents. A property industry paid fees proportional to
the number of projects constructed, rather than for investment outcomes faces248 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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incentives to build more projects regardless of demand. The trend towards entity
ﬁnance (through REITs, etc.) replacing individual project ﬁnance may help create
longer-term perspectives. Agents may evolve into property advisory services seeking
long-term relationships with institutional investors, rather than fees from single
transactions. Securitization of real estate ﬁnance is a signiﬁcant system ‘‘information
structure’’ change. Markets quickly adjust share prices to reﬂect market perceptions
of impending oversupply. This can quickly shut off the ﬂow of capital into new
projects. On the other hand, securitization offers lucrative new sources of fees divorced
from investor outcomes.
Adjustment Time. In a prisoner’s dilemma game it is hard to see how decisions
independent of other decisions can be correct or even evaluated. Each player’s rational
choice leads to irrational collective outcomes. In oversupplied ofﬁce markets,
outcomes for all investors are linked through system-wide price adjustments. Olson
(1971) argued that for better outcomes, cooperation is necessary, enforced by
institutions. Otherwise, each player will want to be a free rider who beneﬁts from the
restraints imposed on others.
Perhaps coordination can be achieved through a change in the information rules of
the ‘‘game,’’ where the players all know what the other ‘‘prisoners’’ are doing.
However, given the momentum of major projects, it seems doubtful that information
alone can stop too many projects from commencing. If collectively irrational behavior
persists or is worsened by better information, a municipal queue or other institutional
enforcement mechanism to prevent over-entry might be considered. A queuing system
could smooth commencements by increasing system adjustment time and rewarding
early entry. A limited entry policy should seek to avoid both undersupply and
oversupply.20 Institutional details must be carefully designed to avoid unintended
effects. A simple rule relating allowable commencements to demand/supply
conditions, with limited planner discretion, would probably be most effective.
Capital markets’ concerns about risk may be the key to political implementation of
system design innovations. Better forecasting and attention to the agency and
prisoners’ dilemma problems could save investors billions in lost rents and depressed
capital values. More stable and efﬁcient markets would improve risk-adjusted returns
to investors and lower costs to tenants. Designing institutions that produce more
efﬁcient system outcomes would give investors and communities a competitive
advantage in attracting lower cost capital for ofﬁce investments.
Conclusion
System dynamics models allow testing innovations in system structure or decision
policies. One avenue for future research is to continue developing SD models for real
estate applications. A second is to test system re-design ideas through implementation
experiments or comparative studies. Humility is appropriate in modeling economic
systems—all models oversimplify, the real test is to try out ideas in practice.
Implementation is not a trivial research problem—the devil is in the institutionalA SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 249
details. I mentioned Singapore’s success in avoiding the oversupply now visible in
most other Asian cities, but Singapore did experience oversupply in the 1980s.
The prisoner’s dilemma game theoretically provides an explanation for market failure
through faulty information. Not knowing which competitive projects will go to
completion, creates a ‘‘circular reference’’ where the feasibility of each project is
contingent on other projects. Municipalities should experiment with simple objective,
hard to corrupt, and self-correcting rules to create more orderly markets. A queuing
system might reduce risks at all stages of development and building operation. No
single innovation is likely to eliminate ofﬁce cycles and it is quite conceivable that
the unintended effect of new institutions or information technology could be to make
cycles worse.
Solutions to the allocative inefﬁciency or market failures evident in ofﬁce markets can
be thought about at two levels. First, individual projects must be properly developed
and underwritten. Property heterogeneity means there are no shortcuts for careful
examination of the feasibility and market for each building in order to price risk and
ﬁnd optimal design, marketing and ﬁnancing solutions. This article argues, however,
that even if one is brilliant and does a perfect job on a project, there may be emergent
dynamics in the market as a whole that nevertheless destroy the bottom line. Outcomes
are a function of system dynamics at the aggregate market level. Increasing allocative
efﬁciency (risk adjusted rates of return) requires changes in system design and
policies. At the market or national level, reducing risks requires collective choice and
institutional innovations.
Appendix
Analytical Solution of a System Dynamics Model of Cyclical
Ofﬁce Oversupply under Simplifying Assumptions
The model in this article is a system of nonlinear difference equations whose order
depends upon the supply lag, SL. If we assume constant values for the parameters
oversupply, OS, and adjustment time, A, and omit the nonlinearity caused by the
nondestruction of buildings, a linear system of difference equations is generated,
which can be solved analytically. The solution enables us to ﬁnd optimum system
parameter settings that, if achieved in practice, could reduce the volatility of
commercial real estate cycles.
One complication is the fact that the supply lag is a system parameter. There will
thus be a different model for every different postulated supply lag. In this analysis,
we work with a two-year supply lag, a plausible assumption. In general, reducing
time lags increases the stability of a dynamic model, so reducing SL is a desirable
policy aim. This Appendix takes the supply lag as given, and focuses upon the
interaction of the oversupply parameter OS with the adjustment time, A. This ratio
reﬂects the ‘‘gain’’ in the system—the degree to which the system dynamics amplify
any initial discrepancy, given a particular ﬁxed SL assumption.250 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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The discrepancy in period t (XVt) is a function of demand (Dt) and supply (St)i n
period t and the equilibrium level of vacancies (Ev):
XV 5 D 2 S 3 (1 2 E ). (1) tt t v
Demand in period t is exogenous. Here we assume demand grows exponentially at
the rate of d percent per annum:
D 5 (1 1 d) 3 D . (2) tt 21
Supply in period t (St) is the sum of supply in period t 2 1 and completions in
t 2 1( Ct21).
S 5 S 1 C . (3) tt 21 t21
SL is the time between the discrepancy (negative excess vacancy) and completions,
the ‘‘delivery’’ of ofﬁce space. OS is multiplied times the excess vacancy to determine
the desired ‘‘orders’’ of new supply, reﬂecting inﬂation by principle/agent conﬂict or
strategic behavior irrationalities. This inﬂated supply order quantity is then divided
by the parameter A to determine how many projects will actually commence, given a
particular level of excess vacancy XV (Equation (1)).
0i f XV , 0 t2SL
C 5 (4) t OS
XV 3 if XV $ 0. t2SL t2SL A
The simulation model can thus be expressed as a pair of coupled fourth order
difference equations:
S 1 0i f[ ( 11 d) z D 2 S z (1 2 E )] , 0 t13 tt 11 v St14 :5 FG OS Dt14 *[(1 1 d) z D 2 S z (1 2 E )] z otherwise tt 11 v 3 A 4 (5)
(1 1 d) z Dt13
The behavior of this model matches that of the simulation system shown in the
previous system. Its linear form is:
OS
S 1 [(1 1 d) z D 2 S z (2[)] z t13 tt 11 S A t14 :5 . (6) FG D 34 t14 (1 1 d) z Dt13
This is more volatile than the article’s model because of the artifact of ‘‘negative
construction’’ when supply exceeds demand. Demolitions do occur at times, so whichA SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 251
Exhibit 9
Magnitude of Dominant Eigenvalue of Model Against Value of x
assumption is better is an empirical question. The eigenvalues of the model indicate
whether the system is stable or unstable. In a difference equation, if any eigenvalue
exceeds one then the model will be unstable. The eigenvalues of this model are zero,
(1 1 d) which is the rate of growth of demand, and the roots of the cubic Equation
(7).
OS 32 l 2 l 1 (1 2 E ) 35 0. (7) v A
While these roots have a complicated form, their magnitude can be plotted as a
function of the constant in the equation. Making the substitution of x for the constant
in the equation (1 2 Ev) 3 OS/A, we can generate the plot shown in Exhibit 9 of the
magnitude of the dominant eigenvalue against different values of the constant.
The plot indicates that the system is unstable for a value of x greater than
approximately 0.6. Given a value for equilibrium vacancies (Ev) of 10%, this means
that the system is unstable if the ratio of OS is divided by A, exceeds two-thirds. A
condition for allocative efﬁciency would be that in the long run DS 5 DD, so supply252 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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and demand remain in balance. Hence, the ‘‘rational’’setting for OS is 1.0. It therefore
seems that a worthwhile policy objective would be to reduce the OS/A ratio to two-
thirds by increasing A to 1.5. This means that only two thirds of required projects
should be begun in any year.
This conclusion is valid as an approximation in a system in which the supply lag is
two periods. A different conclusion could apply for different supply lags (as the
numerical simulations in the paper indicate). However, as a general rule, shifting OS
towards 1.0 and increasing A to smooth commencements over time would result in
greater system stability. Parameter A should not be set too high or system
discrepancies will take too long to eliminate and MAPE due to cyclical behavior will
again increase. With the supply lag reduced to zero through forecasting and (earlier
project commencements as recommended), it is not necessary to increase A to smooth
responses.
Endnotes
1 Barras (1994), Leitner (1994) and Wheaton, Torto and Evans (1995) list additional examples
of ofﬁce market cycles.
2 Minsky (1992) espouses this asset value deﬂation/debt crisis theory of macroeconomic cycles.
Because debt is usually denominated in nominal dollars, asset price deﬂation and non-
performing assets can lead to balance sheet and liquidity problems.
3 Similar dynamics—demand shock, order increase, backlog, catch up and oversupply—occur
in many inventory control problems. Senge (1990) presents a ‘‘beer game’’ inventory control
model in which inventory adjustments and delivery backlogs tend to magnify a small demand
shock into a boom and bust cycle.
4 Additional possible causes of ofﬁce demand changes include demographics like baby boomers
entering the workforce, employment structure changes, corporate cultures, ofﬁce technology and
workspace design.
5 Barlas (1996), Coyle (1996) and Homer (1996) describe methods for validation of SD models.
Formal statistical hypothesis testing is normally impossible with SD models. Instead an arbitrary
structure meant to represent the system is proposed and tested, essentially, by means of forecast
errors relative to historical system data. Non-sample information plays a crucial role. Often,
especially in physical systems, the modeler ‘‘knows’’ that certain relationships hold in the
system. An example, in the present case is our knowledge that it normally takes two to three
years to construct a major ofﬁce building.
6 Prices are omitted from the model for simplicity and to focus attention on the underlying
dynamics. Mohammed Quaddus, Curtin University, Graduate School of Business suggested the
idea of a priceless physical processes model.
7 In the real world, irrational supply may be ordered, even when there is a space surplus.
8 Mohammed Quaddus, Curtin University, Graduate School of Business suggested the idea of
a priceless physical processes model.
9 For example, in Perth, Australia, admittedly an extreme case, excess vacancy was
approximately ﬁve times the size of the largest building.
10 Rosen (1984) used vacancy rate as a proxy for rents.
11 Alternatively, the herd instincts of fund managers. Short-term thinking prevails, regardless of
long term damage to agency businesses from cyclical oversupply and loss of credibility.A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF CYCLICAL OFFICE OVERSUPPLY 253
12 Shilton (1995) found supply lags in different American cities of from zero to four years.
13 The literature includes models to estimate equilibrium vacancy rates. Voith and Crone (1988)
and Pollakowski, Wachter and Lynford (1992) found equilibrium vacancy rates vary between
cities and over time. I simplify by leaving V* an exogenous constant.
14 Sydney 1970–1996 average vacancy was 9.2%. Coefﬁcients from regressions of rent change
on vacancy rates for ﬁve Australian cities indicated 8%–11% equilibrium vacancy rates, but
this model is underspeciﬁed so the coefﬁcients may be biased.
15 If macroeconomic and ofﬁce market cycles were eliminated, then future demand growth
would become a random walk. The best forecast would be the mean of the past net absorption
(a drift term in the demand series). Mueller (1997) reviews methods offered by Torto-Wheaton,
a Boston forecasting ﬁrm.
16 Similar cobweb cycles are observable in inventory control and predator prey systems. For
example, the three years required to produce beef animals leads to an eleven-year cattle cycle.
17 Mean and standard deviation ﬁgures are consistent with 1970–1995 Sydney ofﬁce data.
18 These data include measurement errors. Early data confuse gross and net demand. Data
sources include Knight Frank, Jones Lang Wooten and the Australian Property Council.
19 Singapore assembles land quickly through the powerful Urban Redevelopment Authority
agency. Reviews are expedited because there is only one level of government (as opposed to
signiﬁcant state and municipal reviews in Australia), and a top down, more authoritarian
planning philosophy.
20 Mathematical Bioeconomics (Clark, 1990) develops the economic rationale for limited entry
ﬁsheries regulation. It is well established by theory and experience that absent regulation, too
much capital enters an unregulated ﬁshery. The ﬁxed productivity of ﬁsheries may be analogous
to exogenously derived demand in ofﬁce markets.
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